Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics: Computational Issues

This presentation is based on David Besanko, Ulrich Doraszelski, Yaroslav Kryukov, and Mark A. Satterthwaite, “Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics,” February 8, 2007.

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Learning-by-Doing and Organizational Forgetting

- **Learning-by-Doing (LBD)**
  The out-of-pocket cost for Big Boat Ship Building to construct a new, series X barge is:
  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barge #</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
  
  Big Boat has signed, fixed price contracts to deliver two barges in 2008 and two in 2010. A buyer approaches the yard and offers $15 for delivery of a barge in 2009. Should Big Boat accept?


- **Organization Forgetting (OF)**

- **Argote, Beckman, & Epple** (*Management Science*, 1990), Benkard (*AER*, 2000)

- Benkard (*Rand Journal*, 2004) showed within an analysis of the early competition between Boeing, Douglas, and Lockheed in widebody passenger jets that LBD and OF together can explain Lockheed’s disastrous history with its L1011.
Goal of paper: What is the variety of equilibria that can occur in a duopoly in the presence of LBD and OF? We use Ericson and Pakes’ computational Markov perfect equilibrium model to explore this question.

Model

Representation of Results
- Description of equilibria
- Seeing multiplicity

Discovering multiplicity
- Homotopy approach to finding equilibria
- Failure of Pakes-McGuire algorithm when multiplicity exists
- Tracing out the full equilibrium manifold

Summary
Discrete time, infinite horizon.

Two firms with potentially different stocks of know-how \((e_1, e_2) \in \{1, \ldots, M\}^2\).

In each period, the timing is as follows:
- Firms choose prices.
- One buyer enters the market and makes a purchase.
- Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting occur and the firms’ stocks of know-how change accordingly.

Law of motion:
\[
e'_n = e_n + q_n - f_n,
\]
where
- \(q_n \in \{0, 1\}\) indicates whether firm \(n\) makes a sale;
- \(f_n \in \{0, 1\}\) represents organizational forgetting.
Learning-by-Doing

- Marginal cost of production:

\[ c(e_n) = \begin{cases} 
\kappa e_n^\eta & \text{if } 1 \leq e_n < m, \\
\kappa m^\eta & \text{if } m \leq e_n \leq M, 
\end{cases} \]

where

- \( \eta = \log_2 \rho \) for a progress ratio of \( \rho \in (0, 1] \);
- \( \kappa \) is marginal cost at top of learning curve;
- \( m \) is bottom of learning curve.

- Marginal cost decreases by \( 1 - \rho \) percent as the stock of know-how doubles.
Organizational Forgetting

- Probability of losing a unit of know-how:
  \[ \Pr(f_n = 1) = \Delta(e_n) = 1 - (1 - \delta)^{e_n}, \]

  where \( \delta \in [0, 1] \) is the forgetting rate.

- \( \Delta(e_n) \) is increasing in \( e_n \) in line
  - with experimental evidence in management literature;
  - Jost’s second law in psychology literature;
  - capital-stock models.

- Cabral & Riordan (1994) analyze the special case of \( \delta = 0 \).
In each period, one buyer enters the market and makes a purchase.
A buyer’s idiosyncratic preferences are unobservable to firms.
Demand is logit. Thus probability of making a sale is:

$$\Pr(q_n = 1) = D_n(p_1, p_2) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp\left(\frac{p_n - p - n}{\sigma}\right)},$$

where $\sigma$ is degree of horizontal product differentiation.
Bellman Equation

- \( V_n(e) \) is the expected NPV to firm \( n \) of being in the industry given that the industry is in state \( e = (e_1, e_2) \).
- Bellman equation:

\[
V_n(e) = \max_{p_n} D_n(p_n, p_{-n}(e))(p_n - c(e_n)) \\
+ \beta \sum_{k=1}^{2} D_k(p_n, p_{-n}(e)) \overline{V}_{nk}(e),
\]

where

- \( p_{-n}(e) \) is the price charged by the other firm;
- \( \beta \in (0, 1) \) is the discount factor;
- \( \overline{V}_{nk}(e) \) is the expectation of firm \( n \)’s value function conditional on buyer purchasing from firm \( k \in \{1, 2\} \).
- \( p_n(e) \) is uniquely determined by FOC.
Symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE):

- Value function $V_1^*(\mathbf{e}) = V^*(\mathbf{e})$ and $V_2^*(\mathbf{e}) = V^*(\mathbf{e}[2])$ where $\mathbf{e}[2]$ denotes the vector $(e_2, e_1)$ constructed by interchanging the stocks of know-how of firms 1 and 2.
- Policy function $p_1^*(\mathbf{e}) = p^*(\mathbf{e})$ and $p_2^*(\mathbf{e}) = p^*(\mathbf{e}[2])$.

The Bellman equation and FOC for state $\mathbf{e}$ are

$$V^*(\mathbf{e}) = D_1^*(\mathbf{e}) (p^*(\mathbf{e}) - c(e_1)) + \beta \sum_{k=1}^{2} D_k^*(\mathbf{e}) \overline{V}_k^*(\mathbf{e}),$$

$$0 = \sigma - (1 - D_1^*(\mathbf{e})) (p^*(\mathbf{e}) - c(e_1)) - \beta \overline{V}_1^*(\mathbf{e})$$

$$+ \beta \sum_{k=1}^{2} D_k^*(\mathbf{e}) \overline{V}_k^*(\mathbf{e}).$$

This system of $2M^2$ nonlinear equations, two for each state $\mathbf{e} \in \{1, \ldots, M\}^2$, defines a symmetric equilibrium.

- Existence in pure strategies is guaranteed, uniqueness is not.
Parameterization

- We explore equilibria for the full range of progress ratios $\rho \in (0, 1]$ and forgetting rates $\delta \in [0, 1]$.
- Empirical estimates: $\rho \in [0.7, 0.95]$ and $\delta < 0.1$.
- Remaining parameters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>parameter</th>
<th>$M$</th>
<th>$m$</th>
<th>$\kappa$</th>
<th>$\sigma$</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>value</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$1.05$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- If $\rho = 0.85$, then $c(1) = 10$, $c(2) = 8.50$, and $c(15) = \ldots = c(30) = 5.30$.
- If $\rho = 0.85$, then in the static Nash equilibrium:

  - the own-price elasticity of demand is $-8.86$ in state $(1, 15)$ and $-2.13$ in state $(15, 1)$, and
  - the cross-price elasticity of firm 1’s demand with respect to firm 2’s price is $2.41$ in state $(15, 1)$ and $7.84$ in state $(1, 15)$. 
Four Typical Equilibria

- **Flat:**
  - Firms price near their long run marginal cost from the beginning.
  - Firms do not seek to preempt each other.

- **Well:**
  - Preemption battles fought by firms at the top of their learning curves.
  - Serve to build a competitive advantage $\rightarrow$ transitory advantage.

- **Diagonal trench:**
  - Price wars fought by fairly symmetric firms.
  - Serve to build and defend a competitive advantage $\rightarrow$ permanent advantage.

- **Sideways trenches:**
  - Price wars fought by fairly asymmetric firms.
  - Serve to build and defend a competitive advantage $\rightarrow$ permanent advantage.

*Note that representing in an understandable way the pricing policies of the firms is greatly facilitated by the industry being a duopoly.*
Insert pdf figure: Insert the 4 policy functions.
- Use tools from stochastic process theory to analyze the Markov process of industry dynamics.

- Construct the probability distribution over next period’s state $e'$ given this period’s state $e$.

- Compute the distribution over states:
  - $\mu^t(\cdot)$ is the transient distribution over states in period $t$ starting from state $(1, 1)$.
  - $\mu^\infty(\cdot)$ is the limiting (or ergodic) distribution over states.
Insert pdf figure: insert the transient and limiting distributions.
Understanding Equilibria with Diagonal Trench

- Trench sustains leadership.
  - Suppose trench exists and leadership has value.
  - Follower does not contest the leadership because price war is too expensive and uncertain.

- Leadership generates value.
  - Suppose trench exists, both firms have reached the bottom of their learning curve, and both price identically.
  - If follower starts catching up, it backs off by raising price. Increasing price does not hurt his profits but improves the leaders profits.

- Value of leadership induces the trench.
  - Suppose the two firms are tied on the diagonal and that leadership has value.
  - Both bid aggressively—i.e., price very low—to seize leadership. This creates the trench.
Insert pdf figure: Insert the 4 policy functions.
Multiple equilibria may exist. We can represent this multiplicity by plotting, for each $\rho$, the expected limiting Herfindahl index, $H^\infty$, as a function of $\delta$. Formally,

$$H^\infty = \sum_e \left( D_1^*(e)^2 + D_2^*(e)^2 \right) \mu^\infty(e).$$

The next slide shows $H^\infty$ as a function $\delta$ for several values of $\rho$. 
Insert pdf figure: insert the delta homotopies
Homotopy Technique

- Write the system of $2M^2$ nonlinear equations (Bellman equations and FOCs) as
  \[ F(x, \delta) = 0, \]
  where
  \[ x = (V^*(1, 1), V^*(2, 1), \ldots, V^*(M, M), p^*(1, 1), \ldots, p^*(M, M)). \]
- The object of interest is the equilibrium graph
  \[ F^{-1} = \{ (x, \delta) | F(x, \delta) = 0 \}. \]
- The algorithm follows a path from the unique equilibrium at $\delta = 0$ to the unique equilibrium at $\delta = 1$.
- Polynomial example graphed on next slide:
  \[ f(x, \delta) = -15.280 - \frac{\delta}{1 + \delta^4} + 67.5x - 96.923x^2 + 46.154x^3 = 0. \]
Insert pdf figure: homotopy example
Graphing the Example

- Define a parametric path to be a set of functions \((x(s), \delta(s))\) such that \((x(s), \delta(s)) \in F^{-1}\).

- The conditions that are required to remain "on path" are found by differentiating \(f(x(s), \delta(s)) = 0\) with respect to \(s\) to obtain
  \[
  \frac{\partial f(x(s), \delta(s))}{\partial x} x'(s) + \frac{\partial f(x(s), \delta(s))}{\partial \delta} \delta'(s) = 0.
  \]

- Solving for the ratio does not work at points C and D:
  \[
  \frac{x'(s)}{\delta'(s)} = -\frac{\partial f(x(s), \delta(s))}{\partial \delta} \div \frac{\partial f(x(s), \delta(s))}{\partial x}.
  \]

- But starting at point A and solving the system of differential equations
  \[
  x'(s) = -\frac{\partial f(x(s), \delta(s))}{\partial \delta}, \quad \delta'(s) = \frac{\partial f(x(s), \delta(s))}{\partial x}
  \]
  does work. Check it with \(x^2 + \delta^2 = 1\) to get \(x = \sin(s)\) and \(y = -\cos(s)\).
The General Case

- Differentiate $\mathbf{F}(\mathbf{x}(s), \delta(s)) = 0$ with respect to $s$:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{2M^2} \frac{\partial \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{x}(s), \delta(s))}{\partial x_i} x'_i(s) + \frac{\partial \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{x}(s), \delta(s))}{\partial \delta} \delta'(s) = 0,$$

which gives $2M^2$ differential equations in $2M^2 + 1$ unknowns $x'_i(s), i = 1, \ldots, 2M^2$, and $\delta'(s)$.

- One solution is the “basic differential equations” (BDE),

$$y'_i(s) = (-1)^{i+1} \det \left( \left( \frac{\partial \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{y}(s))}{\partial \mathbf{y}} \right)_{-i} \right),$$

$$i = 1, \ldots, 2M^2 + 1,$$

where $\mathbf{y}(s) = (\mathbf{x}(s), \delta(s))$ and the notation $(\cdot)_{-i}$ is used to indicate that the $i$th column is removed from the $(2M^2 \times 2M^2 + 1)$ Jacobian $\frac{\partial \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{y}(s))}{\partial \mathbf{y}}$. This formula is Cramer’s rule.

- The BDE reduces finding new equilibria to solving an ODE with a known equilibrium as its initial condition.
Equilibrium Graph: Paths and Loops

**Result 2** The equilibrium correspondence $F^{-1}$ contains a unique path that connects the equilibrium at $\delta = 0$ with the equilibrium at $\delta = 1$. In addition, $F^{-1}$ may contain (one or more) loops that are disjoint from the above path and from each other.

This result was derived by running homotopies on $\delta$ from zero to one on a 0.05 grid of $\rho$ values. We display the results of the homotopy by plotting, for each $\rho$, the expected limiting Herfindahl index, $H^\infty$, as a function of $\delta$. Formally,

$$H^\infty = \sum_e \left( D_1^*(e)^2 + D_2^*(e)^2 \right) \mu^\infty(e).$$
Insert pdf figure: insert the delta homotopies
Limitation of Pakes-McGuire (1994) Algorithm

- Combines value function iteration with best reply dynamics (akin to Cournot adjustment).
- Executes the iteration

\[ \mathbf{x}^{l+1} = \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{x}^l), \quad l = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, \]

where, for each state \( e \in \{1, \ldots, M\}^2 \), old guesses for the value and policy of firm 1 are mapped into new guesses.
- In between two equilibria that can be computed by the P-M algorithm, there is one equilibrium that cannot:

**Proposition**

Let \((\mathbf{x}(s), \delta(s)) \in \mathbf{F}^{-1}\). If \(\delta'(s) \leq 0\), then \(\rho \left( \left. \frac{\partial \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{x}(s))}{\partial \mathbf{x}} \right|_{\delta=\delta(s)} \right) \geq 1\)

where here \(\rho\) is the spectral radius of the Jacobian.

- The implication is that, whenever there is multiplicity, the P-M algorithm can at most find 2/3 of the equilibria.
- Darned important to use state-of-the-art algorithms.
Did we find “most” equilibria?

**Observation.** Except for small systems of polynomials it is currently infeasible to prove that one has found all solutions.

**Conjecture.** If the equilibrium correspondence is regular and connected, then all equilibria can be identified by running homotopies along a grid of local coordinates on the manifold.
Insert pdf figure: 3D equilibrium correspondence
What we have discussed:

- Goal: Discover the variety of equilibria that can occur in a duopoly in the presence of LBD and OF?
- Representation of results:
  - Behavior: graph of policy function over states
  - Dynamics: graphs of transient distributions and limiting distribution over states
  - Equilibria should make sense
  - Multiplicity: graph of $H^\infty$ as a function of $\delta$ and $\rho$.
  - More than two firms pose difficulties
- Discovering multiplicity
  - Trace out equilibrium graph using homotopy technique
  - Pakes-McGuire algorithm can only identify a fraction of multiple equilibria
  - Dynamic stochastic games may have a wealth of multiplicity